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35-word Abstract: We show examples of single event functional interrupt and destructive failure in modern POL 
devices. The increasing complexity and diversity of the design and process introduce hard SEE modes that are 
triggered by various mechanisms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ower management has become increasingly important in 
modern integrated circuit (IC) designs.  The power 
architectures in modern ICs are designed around 
microprocessors, Application-Specific-Integrated-Circuits 
(ASIC), or Field-Programmable-Gate-Arrays (FPGA). The 
supply voltage of these devices has continued to shrink (1.5 V 
for current generation), to keep pace with Moore’s Law. 
However the current requirement has not decreased in the 
same fashion. As a result, the increasing power dissipation has 
created challenges for efficient power distribution. Efficient 
power management is particularly important in satellite and 
flight systems, where the limited board space complicates heat 
dissipation means. Flight systems necessarily had to adopt a 
distributed power system, where point-of-load (POL) devices 
are placed in close proximity to each load [1]–[2].  The 
distributed architecture reduces power losses and improves 
system efficiency [1]. The developments have prompted 
product innovations and advances in POL devices (e.g. linear 
regulators, switching regulators, and DC/DC converters). 
The radiation susceptibility of POL devices has remained an 
important consideration for system hardness assurance. 
Voltage regulators are often designed with bipolar or BiCMOS 
technologies, due to the high current drive and fast switching 
requirements. The bipolar processes are vulnerable to 
enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS), a challenging 
hardness assurance issue for bipolar ICs [3]–[4]. These circuit 
types are also susceptible to single event effects (SEE), with 
single event transients (SET) the most commonly dealt issue 
[5]–[6]. Most applications will require output capacitive 
filtering elements to suppress single ion-induced voltage 
glitches. Fortunately most circuit designs ordinarily already 
include several stages of capacitive filtering that are sufficient 
to handle the majority of the smaller SETs.  
The most pertinent issue for radiation hardness assurance is 
destructive SEE. Single event latchup (SEL) is a common 
concern for many of today’s state-of-the-art microelectronics. 
CMOS processes are generally much more susceptible to SEL 
than most bipolar processes. The POL devices that are 
designed with bipolar processes will be relatively less prone to 
SEL than other device types. However bipolar circuits can be 
susceptible to single event burnout (SEB) and single event 
dielectric rupture (SEDR). Moreover, many of today’s POL 
devices incorporate hybrid designs with exotic technologies, 
which increase the vulnerability to various types of destructive 
SEEs. Some switching regulator designs employ several 
different types of technologies, including bipolar, CMOS, 
and/or BiCMOS processes with integrated power MOSFETs. 
The power MOSFETs are particularly vulnerable to SEB and 
single event gate rupture (SEGR), both of which are 
destructive and non-recoverable [7]–[9]. We show examples of 
such destructive failures in a state-of-the-art commercial 
switching regulator.  
Furthermore, POL devices can be susceptible to rail-to-rail 
output dropouts, which are essentially a form of functional 
interrupt. In some cases, the dropouts require power cycling to 
recover operation. These events can disrupt system 
functionality. We will show that different upset modes can 
trigger the functional interrupts in different devices. 
The reduction in size and increase in power output has 
introduced heat dissipation challenges, which can become 
problematic during heavy-ion beam testing. We will also 
discuss the details of these testing challenges, and how they 
can impact irradiation testing.  
II. EXPERIMENTAL 
A. Device under study 
We show results for linear voltage regulators, switching 
regulators, and DC/DC converters from various manufacturers. 
Table I shows the part information featured in this paper, 
including the part number, manufacturer, device type, and 
process technology. We plan to include additional part types in 
the full paper. 
Table I 
Part description 
Part Number Vendor Type Technology 
MSK5059RH M.S. Kennedy Buck 
regulator 
Bipolar 
L5973D S.T. 
Microelectronics 
Buck 
regulator 
CMOS/Bipolar
/LDMOS 
B. Irradiation facility 
We performed heavy ion and laser irradiation through 
several test campaigns. The heavy ion tests were carried out at 
the Texas A&M University Cyclotron Facility (TAMU) and 
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) 
Accelerator Space Effects (BASE) facility. The irradiations at 
TAMU were performed with 15 MeV/amu heavy ions in air. 
The irradiations at LBNL were performed with a cocktail of 10 
MeV/amu heavy ions in vacuum. No beam degraders were 
used during the tests.  
The pulsed-laser irradiation was conducted at the Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) using a dye laser.  
III. RESULTS 
A. MSK5059RH 
We evaluated the MSK5059RH buck regulator through 
several test campaigns with heavy ion and pulsed-laser 
irradiation. We observed an output dropout event during the 
initial heavy ion test at TAMU. Two parts were irradiated with 
identical electrical and radiation test conditions. We observed 
the dropout in one part. Figure 1 shows the supply current as a 
function of irradiation time, during three runs with Au at 45o, 
and device settings of Vin = 7 V, Vout = 3.3 V, and Iout
P 
 = 1.5 
A. During the first run, the input supply current showed 
degradation in a step fashion, decreasing from approximately 
1.18 A to 0.9 A, followed by a bigger decrease to 0.75 A. The 
output voltage degraded from 3.3 V to 2 V accordingly. 
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Finally the input supply current decreased to approximately 
0.006 A, and the output dropped to 0 V. The device recovered 
normal operations after a power cycle. We observed similar 
behaviors during the following runs. The device failed to 
regulate with Vin = 10 V and Iout = 1.5 A, following the third 
run, indicating functional degradation. 
 
Figure 1. Input supply current as a function of irradiation time for the 
MSK5059RH, irradiated with Au at 45o for LETeff = 124 
MeV·cm2/mg, Vin = 7 V, Vout  = 3.3 V, and Iout
 
 = 1.5 V. The traces 
show results from 3 irradiation runs in succession.  
In addition to the heavy-ion and laser irradiations, Linear 
Technology and M.S. Kennedy also investigated the dropout 
phenomenon during a separate heavy ion test at LBNL. They 
also observed output dropout phenomenon. However the part 
showed destructive failure following the dropout. They found 
that the dropout and destructive failure correlated with the part 
temperature. The cooling mechanism inside the vacuum 
irradiation chamber was kept inactive during the initial 
irradiation. The case temperature of the part that showed 
failure had increased to approximately 58oC prior to failure. 
The elevated temperature caused the thermal conductive 
compound to reach its melting temperature. The vacuum 
environment inhibited heat dissipation without the thermal 
compound. Consequently, the junction temperature exceeded 
the specification limit, leading to part failure. They repeated 
the irradiation on another part, while maintaining the cooling 
plate at 5oC during irradiation. The case temperature remained 
at approximately 23o
In addition to the heavy ion irradiations, we used a pulsed-
laser to further investigate the locations of the sensitive 
regions. We found that scanning across one particular die 
location resulted in output dropouts, for V
C throughout the test. They did not 
observe dropout nor destructive failure for that part.   
in = 5 V, Vout = 3.3 
V, and Iout = 0.2 to 4 A. Figure 2 shows the input current as a 
function of time. The output dropped out and recovered with a 
regular frequency on the same order as the laser pulse. We 
determined that the energy threshold was between 55 and 110 
pJ. These laser energy values correspond to LETs of 
approximately 165 to 330 MeV·cm2
We examined a microphotograph of the IC layout (not 
shown here due to vendor confidentiality), and determined that 
the sensitive location is occupied by a junction capacitor, 
which lies across the collector-base region of an NPN 
transistor in the band gap reference. The photocurrent from the 
pulsed-laser is amplified through the NPN transistor gain, 
thereby disrupting the reference loop. 
/mg, based on empirical 
data from previous tests [10].  
 
Figure 2. Input supply current as a function of irradiation time for the 
MSK5059RH, irradiated with pulsed-laser, for energy of 110 pJ, Vin 
= 5 V, Vout  = 3.3 V, and Iout
 
 = 1 V.  
B. L5973D 
 The L5973D buck regulator is manufactured with 
commercial CMOS and bipolar processes, with integrated 
laterally diffused power MOSFET (LDMOS). We irradiated 
two parts with 15 MeV/amu heavy-ions at TAMU. The device 
settings were Vin = 12 and 25 V, Vout = 3.3 V and Iout = 1.6 A. 
The majority of the events were rail-to-rail output voltage 
dropouts. The dropout duration varied from approximately 10 
ms to over 800 ms. The events are self recoverable. The worst 
case dropouts exceeded the oscilloscope setting of 0.8 s, as 
shown in Figure 3. The event cross section at LET = 17.2 
MeV·cm2/mg is approximately 1.5 × 10-6 cm2
We also observed destructive failures. Figures 4 and 5 show 
the input current and output voltage, respectively, for 
irradiation with Ar at 0
. Further tests are 
required to determine the saturation cross section LET and 
threshold LET. 
o and 60o, with LET = 8.6 and 17.2 
MeV·cm2/mg. The device settings were Vin = 25 V, and Iout = 
1.6 A. Both destructive events occurred when we initially 
increased the input voltage to 25 V from 16 V. The first event 
occurred for 60o tilt angle. The input current spiked sharply to 
approximately 1 A before the device power was shut off. The 
output voltage increased to approximately 6 V, decreased to 2 
V, then dropped to 0 V, within approximately 60 ms. The 
second destructive event occurred for 0o tilt angle. The input 
current showed an initial decrease to approximately 50 mA. 
The output voltage fluctuated from 3.3 V to 0 V, before 
dropping out completely.  
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Figure 3. Output voltage as a function of time for the L5973D, 
irradiated with Ar, for Vin = 12 V and Iout  = 1.6 A.  
 
Figure 4. Input current vs. time during destructive events for the 
L5973D, irradiated with Ar at 0o and 60o, for Vin = 25 V and Iout  = 
1.6 A. 
 
Figure 5. Output voltage vs. time during destructive events for the 
L5973D, irradiated with Ar at 0o and 60o, for Vin = 25 V and Iout
IV. DISCUSSION 
 = 
1.6 A. 
A. Self-Recoverable Functional Interrupt 
Although we observed several types of functional interrupts, 
some of the events were affected by temperature and/or TID-
induced parametric degradation. Therefore, we distinguish 
those events from the classical SEE-induced examples. 
We first discuss the laser test results for the MSK5059RH. 
The fact that the voltage dropouts from laser irradiation were 
relatively insensitive to the output load is contrary to the heavy 
ion test results, where the functional interrupt only occurred 
for higher output loads (1.5 and 4 A). Also, the dropouts from 
laser irradiation did not require power cycling to recover, 
unlike the dropouts from the heavy ion tests. The output 
recovered as soon as the laser was removed from the sensitive 
location. The different characteristics suggest that the 
degradation mechanism from the laser test is likely different 
from either of the heavy ion tests. The laser energy threshold 
was between 55 to 110 pJ, which is approximately equivalent 
to LETs of 165 to 330 MeV·cm2
The LET threshold is also much higher than the requirement 
for destructive SEE in most NASA missions – typically > 75 
MeV·cm
/mg, according to NRL [10]. 
These values are much higher than the effective LETs used 
during the heavy ion test campaigns. This may explain why we 
did not observe these event types during the heavy ion tests.  
2/mg. The particle flux is extremely low at such high 
LET. For example, the worst 5 minute average heavy ion flux 
for ions with LET > 100 MeV·cm2/mg is less than 1 × 10-10 
cm2
The switching regulator designs often employ current limit 
functions, to protect the device from over current conditions. 
A heavy ion strike can produce an internal current/voltage 
pulse, which could activate the built-in safety features and 
cause a temporary functional interrupt. The L5973D includes 
several such features, which may have prompted the voltage 
dropouts. There are two current limiting circuits that control 
the current flow through the power switch. The pulse by pulse 
current limit will force the power switch off, when the current 
reaches the internal threshold. And the frequency shifter 
reduces the switching frequency to lower the duty cycle. The 
inhibit function will set the device to standby mode, when the 
inhibit pin exceeds 2.2 V. However the current will be reduced 
to less than 100 µA during standby mode. In our case, the 
input current is approximately 0.017 A during the dropouts. 
Aside from these protection circuits, we have already shown in 
the MSK5059RH, that a strike on a sensitive node in the 
reference circuitry can disable the output. Furthermore, the 
pulse width modulator (PWM) is typically a sensitive 
component in switching regulators. Strikes on the PWM can 
cause missing pulses and/or phase shifts, which can produce 
voltage glitches. However, rail-to-rail dropouts are unlikely. 
We believe that the dropouts in the L5973D most likely 
originate from heavy ion strikes in the reference loop circuitry 
and/or the internal current limit circuitry. The duration of these 
dropouts can be problematic for many applications. 
/sec, in a sun-synchronous polar orbit, during a solar 
particle event. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the 
mechanism, since a similar event can occur with a lower LET 
threshold in a different technology. 
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B. Non-Self-Recoverable Function Interrupt  
We also observed more severe output dropouts that required 
power cycling to recover functionality. We believe that the 
event shown in Figure 1 is caused by heavy-ion dose 
deposition and/or device self-heating.  
The part had accumulated approximately 120 krad(Si) prior 
to the dropout event. The total dose from heavy ion irradiation 
differs significantly from 60
It is more probable that elevated temperature caused the 
output dropout. Although we did not observe destructive 
failure from the initial heavy ion test in TAMU, the part 
eventually showed functional degradation following the third 
dropout event, indicating possible internal physical damage 
from over-heating. We further discuss the destructive failure 
associated with the MSK5059RH below. 
Co, due to its highly non-uniform 
distribution and much higher recombination efficiency [11]. In 
fact, the calculated dose does not account for recombination at 
all. Therefore the given TID value is conservative. Micro-dose 
effects are known to cause threshold voltage shifts in some 
deep micron CMOS devices. However micro-dose effects are 
unlikely to significantly impact the gain degradation and/or 
leakage current in the given bipolar technology. 
C. Destructive failure from device self-heating  
The destructive failure of the MSK5059RH from the heavy 
ion test at LBNL is clearly brought on by device self-heating. 
The part did not have means of heat dissipation once the 
thermal compound dissolved, causing the temperature to 
increase above 58o
The effect of elevated temperature reveals a challenge for 
SEE testing of the latest generation of POL devices, which are 
required to drive high current and low voltage loads. The high 
power conditions necessitate appropriate heat dissipation. Test 
board designs can become complicated, with consideration for 
the low noise requirement for SET characterization, and the 
flexibility of adjustable temperature control for SEL testing. 
The results shown here illustrate that insufficient heat 
dissipation can lead to destructive failure during SEE testing.  
C. The part did not show destructive failure 
from the initial heavy ion test at TAMU, since the ambient air 
facilitated sufficient heat dissipation preventing thermal 
runaway. The temperature effect is also consistent with the 
output load dependence, since the power dissipation increases 
with increasing output load. Therefore we only observed the 
destructive events at relatively high output loading conditions.  
D. Destructive failure from integrated power MOSFET 
The destructive events for the L5973D may be caused by 
SEL, SEB, and/or SEGR, since the device contains CMOS and 
LDMOS processes.  
The input supply terminal is directly connected to the drain 
of the LDMOS. The input current signatures indicate that the 
failure either originated from the power MOSFET, in which 
case the mechanism is SEB and/or SEGR, or that a current 
surge from a SEL propagated to the power MOSFET, leading 
to destructive failure. SEL is a localized phenomenon. So the 
SEL current would need to propagate through several stages of 
circuitry to reach the power MOSFET. We believe that SEGR 
and/or SEB of the LDMOS are more probable. 
A SEGR will either short the gate-to-source junction, 
resulting in a low device input current, or short the gate-to-
drain junction, resulting in an initially high input current. The 
event from the 60o irradiation, which showed a high current 
signature, is consistent with a SEGR that shorted the gate-and-
drain junctions. The event from the 0o irradiation can be 
caused by a SEGR of either type. Although the input current 
decreased initially, the time scale between the current readings 
(taken from the power supply) is on the order of 250 ms. 
Therefore we may not be able to capture an initial current 
spike from a SEGR, which can occur within picoseconds. The 
0o
The events may also be caused by SEB. Both SEB and 
SEGR are sensitive to the incident angle of the ion strike, with 
increased sensitivity for normal incidence strikes. The angular 
sensitivity of SEGR is more prominent than SEB. However, 
recent studies have found that the SEGR susceptibility 
depends on the atomic number of the ion specie, where the 
sensitivity is higher for heavier ions [7]. So the vulnerability of 
SEB increases relative to SEGR, for irradiations with lighter 
elements such as Ar. It is difficult to distinguish the two failure 
modes from the electrical signatures. We are currently 
performing destructive analysis to better understand the failure 
mechanisms. 
 incident event is also consistent with a SEGR shorting the 
gate and source junctions, producing a low drain to source 
current.  
The relatively low LET threshold (8.6 MeV·cm2
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